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1 Introduction
In this communication we propose two logically sound fuzzification and defuzzifi-
cation techniques for implementing a credibility calculus on a set of propositional
expressions. Both rely on a credibility evaluation domain using the rational in-
terval [−1, 1] where the sign carries a split truth/falseness denotation. The first
technique implements the classic min and max operators where as the second
technique implements Bochvar-like operators. Main interest in the communica-
tion is given to the concept of natural fuzzification of a propositional calculus.
A formal definition is proposed and the demonstration that both fuzzification
techniques indeed verify this definition is provided.
2 Logical fuzzification and polarization: an ad-
joint pair
2.1 Introducing logical fuzziness
Let P be a set of constants or ground propositions. Let ¬, ∨ and ∧ denote
respectively the contradiction, disjunction and conjunction operators.
The set E of all well formulated finite expressions will be generated induc-
tively from the following grammar:
∀p ∈ P : p ∈ E, (1)
∀x, y ∈ E : ¬x | (x) | x ∨ y | x ∧ y ∈ E. (2)
The unary contradiction operator ¬ has a higher precedence in the interpretation
of a formula, but we generally use brackets to control the application range of a
given operator and thus to make all formulas have unambiguous semantics. We
suppose in the sequel that all other operators such as implication, equivalence,
xor etc are derived with the help of these three basic operators: contradiction,
conjunction and disjunction.
With these well formulated propositional expressions we associate a rational
credibility evaluation r : E → [−1, 1] where ∀x, y ∈ E, rx = 1 means x is
certainly true, rx = −1 means that x is certainly false and rx > ry (resp.
rx < ry) means that propositional expression x is more (resp. less) credible
than propositional expression y. Such a credibility domain is called L, and we
denote EL = {(x, rx) | x ∈ E, rx ∈ [−1, 1]} a given set of such more or less
credible propositional expressions, also called for short L-expressions.
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We implement the contradiction operator on L-expressions by simply chang-
ing the sign of the associated credibility evaluation, i.e.
∀(x, rx) ∈ E
L : ¬(r, rx) = (¬x,−rx). (3)
The sign exchange thus implements an antitone bijection on the rational interval
[−1, 1] where the zero value appears as contradiction fix-point.
In classical bi-valued logic, it is usual to work syntactically only on the
truth point of view of the logic, the untruth or falseness point of view being
redundant through the coercion to the excluded middle. For instance, writing
”(a, b) ∈ R” implicitly means assuming that this proposition is actually true
and its contradiction false, otherwise we would write ”(a, b) 6∈ R”.
We will also rely syntactically on such an implicit truthfulness point of view
and always denote the truthfulness possibly induced from the underlying cred-
ibility calculus through a truth projection operator1 µ, acting as a positive
domain and range restriction on the credibility operator r.
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Figure 1: Split Truth/Falseness Semantics
Let (x, rx) ∈ E
L be an L-expression:
µ(x, rx) =
{
(x, rx) if rx ≥ r¬x,
(¬x, r¬x) otherwise.
(4)
Truthfulness of a given expression x is thus only defined in case the expres-
sion’s credibility rx exceeds the credibility r¬x of its contradiction ¬x, otherwise
the logical point of view is switched to ¬x, i.e the contradicted version of the
expression (see Figure 1).
As rx ≥ r¬x ⇔ rx ≥ 0 it follows from Equation 4 that the sign (+ or −) of
rx immediately carries the truth functional semantics of L-expressions, in the
sense that an L-expression (x, rx) such that rx ≥ 0 may be called more or less
true (L-true for short) and an expression (x, rx) such that rx ≤ 0 may be called
more or less false (L-false for short).
1In fuzzy set theory, the µ operator generally denotes a fuzzy membership function. We
here choose the same µ symbol on purpose as our main L-valued formulas mostly concern
L-valued characteristic functions.
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Only 0-valued expressions appear to be both L-true and L-false, therefore
they are called L− undetermined 2.
To be able to compute the credibility evaluation associated with any L-
expression, we still need to implement L-valued versions of the conjunction and
disjunction operators.
The classic min and max operators may be used:
∀(x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
L:
(x, rx) ∨ (y, ry) = (x ∨ y, max(rx, ry)) (5)
(x, rx) ∧ (y, ry) = (x ∧ y, min(rx, ry)) (6)
The operator triple < −, min, max > implements on the rational interval
[−1, 1] an ordinal credibility calculus, denoted for short Lo, that gives a first
example of what we shall call a natural fuzzification of propositional calculus.
To appreciate usefulness of our split truth/falseness semantics, let us look
at what happens in the Lo-valued framework with the truthfulness of certain
classical tautologies or antilogies.
For instance, truthfulness of the tautology (x ∨ ¬x) is always given, as
max( rx,−rx) ) ≥ 0 in any case. Tautological Lo-valued propositions thus
appear as being Lo-true in any case. Therefore we call them Lo-tautologies .
On the other hand, truthfulness of the antilogy (x ∧ ¬x) is only defined when
min(rx, r¬x) = 0. More or less “untruthfulness” of such an expression is however
always given. Therefore, we call such propositions Lo-antilogies.
Finally, let us investigate an implicative Lo-tautology such as the modus
ponens for instance. If we take the classical negative (Kleene-Dienes) definition
of the implication, i.e. falseness of the conjunction of r(x) and ¬r(y), we obtain
min( rx, max(−rx, ry) ) ≥ 0 ⇒ ry ≥ 0,
i.e. the following Lo-tautology: “ (x, rx) and (x, rx) ⇒ (y, ry) being conjointly
Lo-true always implies (y, ry) being Lo-true “.
As a main result of our construction, we recover in this sense all classical
tautologies and antilogies as particular limit case if we reduce our Lo-valued
credibility calculus to a bi-valued {−1, 1} one.
2.2 On natural logical polarization
To explore the formal consequences of our split truth/falseness semantics, we
need to formalize the logical defuzzification or polarization we implicitly operate
when applying to L-expressions an L-true or L-false denotation.
Unfortunately, the standard defuzzification technique, denoted in the fuzzy
literature as λ-cuts (see Fodor & Roubens [4]), where λ ∈ [−1, 1] represents
the level of credibility rx from which on a given L-expression is considered to
be true, is not generally consistent with our split truth/falseness semantics (see
Bisdorff [2]).
2“. . . I have long felt that it is a serious defect in existing logic that it takes no heed of the
limit between two realms. I do not say that the Principle of Excluded Middle is downright
false; but I do say that in every field of thought whatsoever there is an intermediate ground
between positive assertion and negative assertion which is just as Real as they. . . . “(C. S.
Peirce, Letter from February 29, 1909 to William James)
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What we need is an extended three-valued cut operator (see Bisdorff &
Roubens [1]). Let EL be a set of L-expressions and let L3 denote the restriction
of L to the three credibility values {−1, 0, 1}. pi : EL → EL
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represents a logical
polarization operator defined as follows:
∀(x, rx) ∈ E
L:
pi(x, rx) =


(x, 1) ⇔ rx > 0
(x,−1) ⇔ rx < 0
(x, 0) ⇔ rx = 0
That pi operator indeed implements our split truth/falseness semantics may be
summarized by stating the following categorical equation.
µ ◦ pi = pi ◦ µ. (7)
and a credibility calculus L verifying Equation 7 is called natural.
For instance, we may show that Lo implements a such natural credibility
calculus. For this we must proof that the pi operation gives a natural transfor-
mation of Lo-valued expressions. Following the general inductive construction of
EL it is sufficient to show naturality of Lo for each of the basic logical operators.
Lo-valued contradiction: for any (x, rx) ∈ E
Lo , if rx > 0 , µ(pi(x, rx)) =
µ(x, 1) = (x, 1) = pi(µ(x, rx)); if rx < 0 , µ(pi(x, rx)) = µ(x,−1) = (¬x, 1) =
pi(¬x,−rx) = pi(µ(x, rx)); and if rx = 0 , µ(pi(x, rx)) = µ(x, 0) = (x, 1) ==
pi(x, rx) = pi(µ(x, rx)).
Lo-valued disjubction: for any (x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lo , if rx > 0 or ry > 0,
µ(pi(x ∨ y, max(rx, ry))) = µ(x ∨ y, 1) = (x ∨ y, 1) = pi(x ∨ y, max(rx, ry)) =
pi(µ(x ∨ y, max(rx, ry))); if rx < 0 and ry < 0, µ(pi(x ∨ y, max(rx, ry))) = µ(x ∨
y,−1) = (¬(x ∨ y), 1) = pi(¬(x ∨ y), min(−rx,−ry)) = pi(µ(x ∨ y, max(rx, ry))).
Finally, Lo-valued conjunction: for any (x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lo , if rx > 0 and
ry > 0, µ(pi(x∧y, min(rx, ry))) = µ(x∧y, 1) = (x∧y, 1) = pi(x∧y, min(rx, ry)) =
pi(µ(x ∧ y, min(rx, ry))); if rx < 0 or ry < 0, µ(pi(x ∧ y, min(rx, ry))) = µ(x ∧
y,−1) = (¬(x ∧ y), 1) = pi(¬(x ∧ y), max(−rx,−ry)) = pi(µ(x ∧ y, min(rx, ry))).
This completes the demonstration.
The Lo credibility calculus is however not the only possible natural credibil-
ity calculus we may define on E.
3 A Bochvar-like fuzzification of propositional
expressions
A second example is given by a multiplicative fuzzification of the classic three-
valued Bochvar logic. We shall denote Lb such a credibility calculus where the
operator triple is denoted < −, g, f >.
We keep the traditional sign exchange as Lb-valued contradiction.
The multiplicative conjunction operator f on a set EL of L-expressions is
defined as follows:
∀x, y ∈ E : rx∧y = rx f ry =
{
| rx × ry | if (rx > 0) ∧ ry > 0),
− | rx × ry | otherwise.
In Figure 2, we may notice that the f-operator, when restricted to a {−1, 1}-
valued domain, is isomorphic to the classic Boolean conjunction operator.
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of the multiplicative conjunctive operator
Similarly, we define the multiplicative disjunction operator g as follows:
∀x, y ∈ P : rx∨y = rx g ry =
{
− | rx × ry | if (rx < 0) ∧ (ry < 0),
| rx × ry | otherwise.
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of the multiplicative disjunctive operator
Again, we may notice in Figure 3 that we recover in the limit, when restricted
to only −1, 1-valued expressions, the classic Boolean disjunction operator.
First, we may verify that the De Morgan duality properties are verified in
Lb. Indeed, we easily see that:
∀(x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lb : rx∧y = r(¬(¬x∨¬y) ).
Indeed, if rx, ry > 0, rx f ry = rx × ry. At the same time, r¬x g r¬y =
(r¬x × r¬y) = −(rx × ry). On the contrary, if rx, ry < 0, rx f ry = −(rx × ry),
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then r¬x g r¬y) = (r¬x × r¬y) = (−rx ×−r(y) = rx × ry . If either rx > 0 and
ry < 0 or vice versa, the duality relation is equally verified.
It is most interesting to notice that in the case where both Lb-expressions
are Lb-true, respectively Lb-false, both operators f and g give the same Lb-
credibility. The operators diverge in their result only when contradictory Lb-
truth assessments are to be combined. The conjunctive operator aligns the
Lb-false part where as the disjunctive operator sustains the Lb-true part of the
pair of propositions.
We may furthermore notice that the negational fix-point, the zero value,
figures as logical “black hole” as is usual in the three-valued Bochvar logic,
absorbing all possible logical determinism through any of both binary operators.
∀(x, rx) ∈ E
Lb : rx f 0 = rx g 0 = 0.
Let us denote ELb/−1;1 the equivalence classes of all certainly true or false
Lb-expressions. The restriction of the Lb credibility calculus to E
Lb
/−1:1 gives a
classic Boolean algebra.
It is remarkable however, that such a priori obvious properties as impo-
tency of conjunction and disjunction, are only satisfied in this limit Boolean
case. Indeed in general, the natural logical consequence of combining more and
more fuzzy propositions will sooner or later necessarily end up with a com-
pletely undetermined proposition. The same is true when combining conjunc-
tively or disjunctively a number of times the same fuzzy proposition. Indeed,
∀(x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lb such that rx 6= 0 we have:
| rx | > | rx f ry |,
| rx | > | rx g ry | .
We recover here a similar situation as in classic error propagation. The more
we operate with imprecise numbers, we more we increase the imprecision of the
out-coming result, and this imprecision is essentially related to the imprecision
of the initial inputs.
Finally, to validate now the naturality property of the Lb calculus, we must
show that the curly operators g and f verify Equation 7. In order to do so, it
is again sufficient to show that for any (x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lb and both the curly
operators we have:
µ(pi(x ∨ y, rx g ry)) = pi(µ(x ∨ y, rx g ry)),
µ(pi(x ∧ y, rx f ry)) = pi(µ(x ∧ y, rx f ry)).
Indeed, for any (x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lo , if rx > 0 or ry > 0, µ(pi(x ∨ y, rx g
ry))) = µ(x ∨ y, 1) = (x ∨ y, 1) = pi(x ∨ y, rx g ry) = pi(µ(x ∨ y, rx g ry); if
rx < 0 and ry < 0, µ(pi(x ∨ y, rx g ry)) = µ(x ∨ y,−1) = (¬(x ∨ y), 1) =
pi(¬(x ∨ y), rx f ry) = pi(µ(x ∨ y, rx g ry)).
And for any (x, rx), (y, ry) ∈ E
Lo , if rx > 0 and ry > 0, µ(pi(x∧y, rxfry)) =
µ(x ∧ y, 1) = (x ∧ y, 1) = pi(x ∧ y, rx f ry) = pi(µ(x ∧ y, rx f ry); if rx < 0 or
ry < 0, µ(pi(x∧y, rx fry)) = µ(x∧y,−1) = (¬(x∧y), 1) = pi(¬(x∧y), rx gry) =
pi(µ(x ∧ y, rx f ry)).
This concludes the demonstration that Lb does indeed implements a natural
credibility calculus.
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4 Moving on
In order to situate now the whole family of natural credibility calculus one may
define on propositional expressions, let us explore two directions for further
investigations.
Following the general properties of the Lo calculus, we may want to con-
sider the t-norm concept as potential generalization. Unfortunately, the split
truth/falseness semantics is not quite compatible with the formal properties of
a t-norm. Indeed, let us recall that a t-norm T defined on the interval [−1; 1]
should verify the following four axioms:
T (1, rx) = rx, ∀rx ∈ [−1; 1] (8)
T (rx, ry) = T (ry, rx), ∀rx, ry ∈ [−1; 1] (9)
T (rx, ry) ≤ T (ru, rv) if −1 ≤ rx ≤ ru ≤ 1,−1 ≤ ry ≤ rv ≤ 1 (10)
T (rx, T (ry, rz)) = T (T (rx, ry), rz), ∀rx, ry, rz ∈ [−1; 1]. (11)
It is easily verified that the multiplicative conjunctive operator f verifies three
of these axioms, i.e. all except the third one. This is not astonishing, as this
axiom is not so “naturally” a logical axiom but rather a geometrical axiom
underlying the “triangularity” heritage of the t-norm concept.
What axiom could advantageously replace the “triangular” t-norm condition
in order to make fit conceptually the t-norm to a natural credibility calculus on
the rational interval [−1, 1] ?
A possibility might be the following:
| T (rx, ry) |≤| T (ru, rv) | if 0 ≤| rx |≤| ru |≤ 1, 0 ≤| ry |≤| rv |≤ 1.
In some sense we would recover the triangular axiom in some absolute terms.
But this idea has still to be further explored.
Finally, more following the semiotical intuitions of C.S. Peirce, we may
interpret the classic ordinal Lo credibility calculus and the above introduced
Bochvar-like Lb credibility calculus as some limit constructions of a same semi-
otical foundation of logical fuzziness. Indeed, the Lo calculus to be applicable
in a practical setting supposes a same closed universal semiotical reference for
all ground propositions p ∈ P as is usual in a mathematical logic context for
instance, where as the multiplicative model apparently supposes shared semiot-
ical references for all determined parts and disjoint semiotical references for the
logically undetermined parts of each proposition p ∈ P as is usual for instance
in repetitive physical measures with error propagation.
These general considerations leave open the case where each ground expres-
sion p ∈ P is completely supported by a different semiotical reference. In this
last case we would get as third limit case some kind of aggregational logic (see
Bisdorff [3]) as implemented by the concordance principle in the multicriteria
approach to preference aggregation for instance.
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